Partisan Unsorting

(intuition! arguments! a conjecture!)

Luke Thorburn

December 2023

ENGAGEMENT


based ranking for

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
BRIDGING

based ranking for







FORMALISM




FORMALISM



OUTCOMES



THEORY FORMALISM OUTCOMES



II.

III.

IV.

Sortedness

Why unsort?

How to unsort?


Can we unsort?


I. Sortedness

. Why unsort?


How to unsort?


Can we unsort













How to quantify the overall amount of crosscutting?





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




























Crosscutting ∝ **Dependence**








Crosscutting ∝ **Dependence**



Crosscutting ∝ Dependence = Sorting










MORE SORTED

LESS SORTED









MORE SORTED


LESS SORTED

PERFECT DEPENDENCE

~INDEPENDENCE







MORE SORTED LESS SORTED

PERFECT DEPENDENCE

NO CROSSCUTTING

EVERYBODY CROSSCUTTING

~INDEPENDENCE

I. Sortedness

. Why unsort?

How to unsort?

Can we unsort

I. Sortedness

II. Why unsort?

How to unsort?

Can we unsort

Sorting is real.	
Sorting is bad.	Unsorting is good.

Sorting is real.

Direct measurement:

(e.g., Abrams et al. 2015, Kaplan et al. 2022)

- ↑ correlations between issue positions
- "no evidence of polarization; the middle has not shrunk"
- ↑ geographic sorting

Explains empirical trends:


(Levendusky 2009; Abrams & Fiorina 2015; Fiorina 2017)

- ↑ difference in approval ratings
- ↓ split ticket voting
- campaigning to convince → campaigning to mobilize
- ↑ affective polarization

Sorting is bad.

Unsorting is good.





nohilize

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Sorting is bad.

- ↑ pigeonholing / stereotyping
- ↓ representation of nuanced, crosscutting positions (Fiorina 2016)
- ↑ risk of civil war (Selway 2011; Gubler and Selway 2012; Siroky and Hechter 2016)

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Unsorting is good.

- ↑ "surprising validators" (Glaeser and Sunstein 2014)
- ↑ extent to which any majority will have something in common with a minority
- ↑ weak/long ties → ↑ economic outcomes
 (Jahani et al., 2023)

Sortedness by other names:

safeguards against factionalism

James Madison, The Federalist No. 10 (1787)

"intersection of social circles"

Georg Simmel, Soziologie (1908)

"overlapping memberships"

Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956)

"overlapping consensus"

John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (1993)

"diverse diversities"

Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence* (2006)

"connected society" / "polypolitanism"

Danielle Allen, Justice by Means of Democracy (2023)

Why not unsort?

- Probably too neutral a goal
- Maybe absurd if taken to the extreme
- Maybe the necessary interventions would be unethical
- Makes engaging in politics more complicated

I. Sortedness

II. Why unsort?

How to unsort?

Can we unsort

THIS EXAMPLE

IN GENERAL

- What isn't clear?
- Have you thought about unsorting in your work, maybe by another name? If so, how do you think about it?
- In what contexts is unsorting is an appropriate goal?

- Are there times in your peacebuilding work when you have consciously excluded certain goals in favour of others?
- How should we decide what goals are appropriate in different contexts?

I. Sortedness


I. Why unsort?

III. How to unsort?

Can we unsort

Mechanism 1

Conversion



FXAMPLES

common ground
symmachy / common enemies
surprising validation

consilience

weak / long ties


"complicate the narratives"


Most bridging algorithms use "diverse approval".




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








MORE SORTED LESS SORTED









MORE SORTED







MORE SORTED

Cognitive "biases"


- mere-exposure effect
- illusory truth effect
- experience effects
- anchoring
- pressures to conform


Learning

- learning new facts
- discovering new interests


Algorithmic incentives (Brady et al., 2023)

- observational learning
- reinforcement learning
- intentional strategic adaptation






THEORY FORMALISM OUTCOMES



Mechanism 2

Adding or removing groups/dimensions




EXAMPLES

humanization
intergroup contact
depoliticization

Mechanism 3

Entry or exit of people



FXAMPLES

migration
generational change
account creation / deletion

THIS EXAMPLE

What isn't clear?

- How does this theoretical mechanism change your view of diverse approval?
- Does it increase your confidence in it?

IN GENERAL

- To what extent does theory of this sort inform your work? Examples?
- How important is it to have this kind of theoretical, mechanistic understanding?
- Should theory of this sort change our confidence in a formalism?

I. Sortedness

I. Why unsort?

III. How to unsort?

Can we unsort


I. Sortedness


IV.


Why unsort?


How to unsort?


Can we unsort?



















Sortedness is orthogonal to "public opinion".



MORE SORTED

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


THIS EXAMPLE

How important are these kinds of formal properties?

IN GENERAL

• What properties should formalisms have?



THEORY FORMALISM OUTCOMES